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Abstract
This paper examines insider trading, specifically trades by corporate insiders around quarterly
earnings announcements. Announcements were broken up into three categories: earnings above
analyst expectations, earnings below expectations, and earnings in line with expectations. Trade
data was collected from the thirty companies of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 2012-’13.
The trades were sorted by purchases and sales by date and analyzed with the earnings report of
which the trades were made. Only trades in the interval from twenty days before the announcement
date to twenty days after the announcement date were considered. The prediction was that
corporate insiders would leverage their inside knowledge to delay trading until after the earnings
announcement. They would benefit financially by trading after the announcement and draw less
attention from the SEC, as they delayed trading until the announcement became public
information. However, knowing how the market would react would allow them to make a
meditated decision. For an announcement that was below analyst expectations, corporate insiders
should buy stock after the market reaction causes the price to drop. Our findings were that
corporate insiders did in fact wait until the announcement day and overall were net buyers. The
study will give better insights into how corporate insiders trade and how restrictions can be made
to stop this insider trading activity.
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Introduction
“There is no inherent moral duty for a newly arrived grain merchant to tell the people in the city
of his arrival that there are other grain merchants one day behind him.” This quote was spoken by
Aquinas hundreds of years ago and is still a current concern in modern ethics. However, instead
of grain merchants, the modern merchants are inside traders and their grain is information. Since
the 1970s and 1980s, insider trading scandals have been a priority of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to root out and discourage future abuse. Although the SEC has been able to
prosecute people who have been guilty of using inside information, the culture of insider trading
in business has grown and in turn the SEC has vamped up its efforts to stop it.
Throughout the course of this paper, insider trading will be discussed; what insider trading is, who
can be guilty of it, as well as the differences between legal and illegal insider trading. This paper
will discuss several different studies about insider trading and the impact that each study had.
Insider trading has been studied, written about, and there have even been movies and television
shows about it. It is a reoccurring theme in a financially driven world. People always want more,
especially in the United States where money is a big motivator and an indicator of success. To
quote Michael Douglas as Gordon Gekko in the movie Wall Street, “Greed is good”. Gordon
Gekko was a man who could do no wrong when it came to trading stocks. He always seemed to
be the smartest guy on Wall Street. People flocked to him to get any piece of advice that could
make them wealthy. His counterparts on Wall Street were in awe of his skill at picking stocks and
resented him for they could not manage the same success. The grand illusion orchestrated by
Gekko came to a crash in the movie when evidence of illegal insider trading was found. Gekko’s
public persona as the financial guru ceased to exist and everyone was aware of the fraud that he
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was. The movie showed the stark truth on how one could benefit from having non-public
information at their disposal to make a fortune. Despite Hollywood’s ability to produce quite
imaginative plots, there was in fact some truth in Wall Street. Gordon Gekko did not exist, but the
traits embodied by Gekko lived in the man who the fictional character was based on. The man who
rose and fell as Gekko did by trading on insider information was none other than Ivan Boesky.
Boesky was one of the biggest cases in history of illegal insider trading and after the news of his
deceit came out, the public lost substantial faith in traders and the markets. Not only did his trading
affect the market, but he even impacted the market after he stopped trading. This shows the
profound affect that illegal insider trading can have on the market.
Today, many of the cases of insider trading go relatively unnoticed, as many of the suspected or
charged traders do not have the public persona or flair of an Ivan Boesky or Michael Milken. The
biggest cases that drew attention most recently include those of Martha Stewart, Raj Rajaratnam,
and Mark Cuban (Cuban was ruled innocent of all charges). The SEC has many tough obstacles to
overcome, and with each victory, a new challenge arises as traders adopt and adapt to new ways
to cheat the system. One of the new ways that insiders have begun to trade on inside information
include trading based on price movements. Three major ways in which the price moves that an
insider can be aware of include stock repurchase agreements by firms, earnings reports, and
mergers and acquisitions. The study of this paper will focus on quarterly earnings announcements
and the trades made by insiders around these announcements. The rest of the paper will include
the literature review, the question this paper addresses, the hypothesis stated, the method of
research and the data, and the results. The hope of the paper is that it will address issues of insider
trading around quarterly earnings reports and benefit the investment world.
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Literature Review
Introduction
“’Insider trading’ is a term that most investors have heard and usually associate with illegal
conduct. But the term actually includes both legal and illegal conduct. The legal version is when
corporate insiders—officers, directors, and employees—buy and sell stock in their own
companies. When corporate insiders trade in their own securities, they must report their trades to
the SEC. Illegal insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in breach of a
fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of material, and/or
nonpublic information about the security. Insider trading violations may also include ‘tipping’
such information, securities trading by the person ‘tipped,’ and securities trading by those who
misappropriate such information” (SEC). Despite popular belief, insider trading is not only done
by top executives and Wall Street traders, but it can be done by any employee in a company of
which the stock is being traded. The main laws dealing with insider trading are the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The 1933 act makes it illegal to trade based on
non-public information. The act of 1934 regulates trading securities in the secondary market and
the illegality of using non-public information to benefit oneself. Another important aspect of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is that it created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The Exchange Act gives the SEC power to sanction, fine, and punish market participants who
violate federal securities laws. Corporate insiders are regulated primarily in four areas: 1)
restrictions against trading on inside information, 2) recapture provisions for short-swing trading
profits, 3) stringent and exact rules regarding sales of restricted and control securities, and 4)
personal ownership reporting obligations (Goldberg [1973]).
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Insider trading is split into two categories; legal and illegal. Legal insider trading can be any
employee who trades stock of their company but does so with the same general knowledge of the
company that is available to the public. Another example of legal insider trading is anyone who
accidentally overhears information that is non-public. The person that overheard the information
can trade without being at fault for breaking any insider trading laws. Illegal insider trading is
using non-public information when trading to generate profits or to prevent any losses. Illegal
insider trading is often hard to prove because it is usually one person’s word against another.
However, in some cases the SEC has been able to prove the use of such illegal trading through
non-public information by witnesses and wire-tapping.
However, illegal insider trading is not what it once was. Public opinion is that it is corporate
executives selling information to buyers in returns for large sums of cash. That still happens, but
a safer way of cheating the system has become popular. Instead of a few big trades where millions
of dollars are made, traders today are making many trades for thousands of dollars at a time. Instead
of paying their tipsters up-front, they do it through commission fees, making it even more difficult
for institutions like the SEC to catch these criminals. Instead of information on the performance
of a company, the traders look for big purchases or the selling of shares by large institutions. The
large investment by these institutions usually have a strong effect on the share price of the company
they are buying or selling. If they buy a large amount of stock, usually in the hundreds of
thousands, of shares of a company, the price may go up a few dollars before the market corrects
itself and goes back down to its normal price. If traders know of this transaction before the public
is made aware, they can buy the stock at normal price and then sell it at the higher price making a
decent sized profit. Or, if the trader is aware that the institution is going to sell-off or “dump” a
large holding of stock, they can short-sell the stock making a good profit on the difference.
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(CNNMoney). This type of trading has become much more frequent in the market, and very few
traders have been prosecuted for using this type of illegal trading. This type of scam is hard to
track as the traders have become smarter at covering their tracks. Institutions are now changing
the way they invest in hopes of reducing the amount of illegal profits made by these traders.
Institutions are now slowly buying up small amounts of shares of a stock or a fund instead of
buying large amounts at one time. Institutions are tightening the lips of their employees in hopes
to reduce any leaks of potential investments. Institutions are starting to use electronic trading
systems to avoid the human middleman who could learn of such information and inform others of
the potential trade. Traders tend to be more discreet around inside information today when sharing
information. They might call up a contact and hint at a company, but usually refrain from saying
anything directly.
There are several types of news that insider traders base their trades on. The news that affects stock
prices of a company can include mergers and acquisitions, stock repurchases by the company, and
earnings reports. This paper will focus on inside traders’ activity around earnings reports. An
unexpected positive or negative report will cause the stock price of a company to fluctuate. This
will cause non-insiders to buy or sell the stock depending on whether it is a positive or negative
report. Corporate insiders learn of what the earnings will be, if it will be higher or lower than
expected, and base their actions on how the market will react. If they know the report will be lower
than expected, then the trader will wait to buy shares of stock after the announcement when the
shares are at a lower price. If the earnings announcement is going to be higher than expected, then
the trader will hold off on selling his or her shares until after the announcement is made to
maximize profit. This paper will provide an overview of each type of trading based on news,
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including what the news is, how stock prices are affected, and the studies done on each one. The
results will be compared as will the methodology for each researcher.

IT & Repurchase Announcements:
The study done by Foued Hamouda and Mounira Ben Arab [2011], titled Board of Directors and
Insider Trading with Share Repurchase Programs, focuses on insider trading practices by the
board of directors of Fortune 500 firms. The study focuses on repurchase agreements done by
companies between 1998-2004, and how directors on the boards of these companies used
information to gain abnormal returns. The study looks from 1998 to 2004, where the amount of
share repurchases by companies grew at an annual rate of 37.1%, whereas dividends during that
time only grew by an annual rate of 7.9%. Another reason the study stops at 2004 is that in 2004
a law was put into effect to mandate companies to announce the repurchase agreement in advance.
The hypothesis of the study was that there would be an increase in refrained selling (that is board
members would delay selling their shares until after the announcement) by board members before
a share repurchase and a decrease in holdings after the share repurchase announcement. To test the
hypothesis, the researchers first hand collected data using Lexis-Nexis, which has data on
repurchase agreements and the Insider Filing Data Files (Form 4), which tracks insider trades. The
study gathered data on 105 firms and 130 repurchase agreements. From there they were able to
gather some correlations based on the data. One correlation was that the board members that were
independent directors (those who did not work for the company), only agreed to repurchase
agreements that benefited the shareholder. Another factor in the study is that the director of the
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board, the chairman, has significant influence on the board. An independent chairman will focus
on repurchase agreement that help the shareholders. A correlation from the study shows that a
chairman that is also the CEO, will increase board member trading before and after repurchase
agreement announcements as well as have more repurchase agreements by the firm than an
independent chairman. To limit insider trading based on share repurchase announcements, in
theory, the responsibilities of the CEO and chairman would have to be split up. Another
relationship found in the study was the amount of stock options board members had. The more
options members had, the less likely they were to get involved in trading on share repurchase
agreements. This is because with a greater amount of shares, their concern lies with the long-term
growth of the company, and like other shareholders, want what is best for shareholders. Directors
who have fewer stock options are more likely to buy shares before agreements and sell shares after.
The Conclusion from the study is that insiders accelerate net selling in the six months after the
share repurchase agreement announcement. There is also evidence of buying shares at a lower
price before the announcement and selling the shares at the higher price after the announcement.
IT & Earnings Announcements:
Yong-Chul Shin and Weimin Wang [2011] conducted a study about corporate insiders, specifically
CEOs, CFOs, and COOs, and their trading patterns around earnings announcements. They
published their study in an article, The Timing of Insider Trades around Earnings Announcements:
Evidence from CEOs, CFOs, and COOs. The goal of the paper was to determine whether top
managers of a firm execute the timing of their trades based on their insider knowledge of both
current earnings reports (that is earnings reports that are upcoming) and future earnings reports.
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The authors state that top executives possess private information about the earnings of the firm
because they are the drivers of corporate policy as well as overseeing the operations and finance
of the firm. It is illegal for insiders to trade based on insider information, but it can be hard to prove
in a court of law. They may have legitimate reasons for trading shares for personal consumption,
diversification of wealth, and liquidity purposes. This allows managers to trade on news and
conceal it as a legitimate transaction.
The method that is different in this research study is that the authors examine insider trades around
two earnings announcement periods, rather than just a single period earnings announcement. The
study states that for optimal returns, a trader would have to time their trades based on both the
current period earnings report and the future period earnings report. An example of this would be
if the current period earnings announcement is going to be bad, but the future period earnings
announcement will be good, insiders will hold off buying or selling stock before the first report
and then when prices dip after a bad earnings report, buy up shares and wait until they appreciate
after the future good announcement. This will also make it more difficult for the SEC to track on
trades made based on future periods rather than the current periods.
Furthermore, the study separates trades made by CEOs, CFOs, and COOs. The research in the
report shows that only CFOs buy more shares after a bad report in anticipation of a good future
report, and sell more shares after a good report when the future report is anticipated to be bad.
When the current period earnings report is expected to be good as well as the future period report,
all three managers buy more shares before the first report is released. There is empirical evidence
that CFOs use their increased knowledge of the firm’s financial performance to take advantage of
future earnings prospects. Not only do CFOs have great influence in financial decisions of the

The Discreet Trader
Senior Capstone Project for Seth Wing

11

firm, but the CFO trades with more financial information than the CEO or COO. Thus CFOs
leverage their financial knowledge to exploit differences in current and future earnings
announcements to maximize profits.
The predictions of the study are thus: Managers will:
1. Purchase more shares before good earnings report, in anticipation of good future earnings
prospects.
2. Purchase more shares after bad earnings report, in anticipation of good future earnings
prospects.
3. Sell more shares after good earnings report, in anticipation of bad future earnings prospects.
4. Sell more shares before bad earnings report, in anticipation of bad future earnings
prospects.
5. Sell fewer shares before good earnings report, in anticipation of good future earnings
prospects.
6. Sell fewer shares after bad earnings report, in anticipation of good future earnings
prospects.
7. Buy less shares after good earnings report, in anticipation of bad future earnings prospects.
8. Buy less shares before bad earnings report, in anticipation of bad future earnings prospects.

These predictions assume that managers that have information on current and future earnings
reports will act on it or at least factor it in to their decision making process.
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After making their hypotheses, the authors gathered the data. They gathered insider trading data
from the Insider Trading Database by Thomson Financial and gathered data on company financials
obtained from COMPUSTAT. The data ranges from 1992 to 2001 and ends in 2001 because the
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 1 changed the disclosure practice of insider trades. This
changed the power of the data of insider trading after SOX was passed because insiders trades
were more easily scrutinized. All of the trades in this study pertained to open market purchases or
sales by CEOs, CFOs, and COOs. This study separates purchases and sales, rather than using net
sales. The data reported that insiders are net sellers, with a mean difference of $624,593.00. This
is consistent with prior studies, which also indicate that insiders are net sellers. Also the typical
company being studied is a small cap firm with a median market value of $635 million. After the
trades data were run, it was found that 51% of all insider trades occur 30 days after the earnings
announcement, 18% in the 30 days leading up to the announcement, and 31% of trades happen in
the middle 30 days of the quarter. Many firms place restrictions on trades before the announcement
to limit trades. Information asymmetry is higher in the period before the announcement, so it is
much riskier for an insider to trade during this period without causing suspicion. Thus trading after
the announcement dismisses a lot of suspicion. In terms of mean dollar amount of trades as a
percentage of total market value of the firm, it is much larger in the period before the
announcement than the other periods.
As for the results, after some statistical analysis is conducted a few patterns are recognized. For
the CEO/COO of a company, there was more buying before good earnings reports and in
anticipation of good future prospects (prediction 1). There was less buying before good earnings

Sox changed the reporting window of trades from 40 days after the trade to 2 days after the transaction.
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reports when the future earnings report was bad (prediction 7). There was also less buying before
bad earnings reports and bad future reports (prediction 8). As for the CFO, there was more selling
after good earnings report in anticipation of bad future reports (prediction 3). There was also more
buying after a bad earnings report in anticipation of good future earnings reports (prediction 2).
There was no evidence supporting prediction 4. The evidence shows that CFOs’ trading is the most
opportunistic because they have the most information on current and future earnings reports. The
report shows how the top level executives are able to obtain abnormal returns using their inside
knowledge of future earnings. It also highlights the difference in trading patterns between
CEOs/COOs and CFOs.

Effective Methods in Limiting Insider Trading
There have been a few studies conducted based on incentives for insiders trading on their private
information and what methods can be used to decrease those incentives. One of those studies
examines how implementing a general counsel (GC) to monitor employee trades can reduce illegal
trades. The study was titled Corporate Governance and the Information Content of Insider Trades
and was written by Alan D. Jagolinzer, David F. Larcker, and Daniel J. Taylor [2011]. The study
focused on restrictions placed on traders by the firms. Many firms have restricted trading windows,
which are time periods where employees are not allowed to trade, usually before an earnings or
big company news announcement. However, the study shows that during these restricted trading
windows, insider profits are higher, but if the trades need to be approved by the general counsel,
profits are significantly lower. The traders that make higher profits do not require general counsel
approval. A hypothesis can be made that the GC is just for show, to make it look like the company
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is serious. The numbers indicate that insider trades that do not require GC approval average .03%
risk-adjusted returns. Other firms however, have general counsels that strictly monitor trades, and
in fact need to approve a trade for it to go through. This reduces the incentive greatly to trade on
inside information, as the risk-adjusted return for insider trades that require GC approval is -.01%.
This is a .04% difference, which is quite large over time. The conclusion of this study is that active
monitoring by a general counsel significantly reduces insider trading profits and that restricted
trade windows do not appear binding for those with a loose GC.
Another study that examined a correlation between corporate insiders and insider trading was
Insider Activity, Tenure Length, and Managerial Compensation by A. Can Inci [2012]. The study
shows the correlation between length of employment and profit on insider trades. Managers that
have a shorter tenure generally have a higher profit margin on insider trades. A theory for this is
that managers who have shorter tenures have to rely on insider trading as part of their
compensation. Managers with longer tenure have a longer period to grow their salary and thus
have lower profit margins on trades. Firms that restrict insider trades tend to provide managers
with a higher traditional compensation to cover the opportunity cost of the foregone opportunity
to trade on insider information. If the firms liberalize insider trading, then they can expect to pay
managers a lower traditional compensation.
As tenure increases, compensation, bonuses, and perquisites all increase, so the incentive to trade
off of inside information decreases. There is a negative correlation between insider trading activity
and tenure length. The study looked at the following:
1. Insider trading leads to positive and significant profit consistently.
2. Insider trading profit and tenure are negatively related across all types of insiders.
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3. Insider trading profit has increased in recent years, especially after SEC rule 10b 5-1 in 2000.
4. Managers with longer tenure engage in insider trading transactions that have lower profits.
5. Managers with shorter tenures rely on insider profits as compensation, so insider trading profits
are greater.
6. Different measurements of insider profits, such as calendar day returns of insider transactions,
holding period returns across different horizons, or weighted average cumulative abnormal
returns give consistent support to the above conjectures.
7. The results of the above propositions should be robust to various well-known empirical
models, such as CAPM model, the Fama and French [1993] three-factor model, or the Carhart
[1997] four-factor model.
The data is based on Form 4 filings of the SEC open market trades by officers, directors, and
owners of more than 10% shares between the years of 1975 to 2011. Stock returns are obtained
from the Center for Research Security Prices (CRSP). The sample size consisted of 1,294,618
reported insider purchase trades. A Conclusion from this study was that compensation based partly
on insider trades is one way to reduce information asymmetry as the market could track the trades
and adjust expectations to company news based on purchases or sales.
Similarities
Many of the sources reviewed had similarities. All dealt with similar data; that is trade sales and
purchases, trade dates, and the title of the insider who made the trades. Some of the positions were
more specific than others, but almost all dealt with some higher ranking employee. Of all the
studies that were looked at, many of the authors had similar approaches. The authors first came up
with a hypothesis. These included insiders acting on their information to make a financial gain.
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The reports differed on what specific information each trader focused on. After the hypothesis was
made, the data was collected. Stock trading information was gathered from a database, as well as
filings made by insiders declaring the sales and purchases made. The trading data was over a span
of years, each varying in length and had a large number of trades for a larger sample size, so the
data would be more representative. Then the data was analyzed using various statistics models to
find patterns. The authors often had several hypotheses about what the data would portray. For
most of the studies, their hypotheses were correct, and the data proved several of the hypotheses
wrong. After they had analyzed the data, each finished with a conclusion, wrapping up their study
and perhaps making a recommendation to help fix asymmetrical information, or unfair trading.
Differences
The sources that were evaluated shared similarities, but in most cases had a lot of differences.
Many of the studies had different theories on which type of information was more valuable to
insiders. Some focused on earnings announcements, some on share repurchases, and some on
corporate activity such as mergers and acquisitions. The data was fairly consistent, although some
of the studies looked at sales and purchases separately, while others combined them and analyzed
them as net sales. Some of the articles were strictly on economical inefficiency of insider trading
and some had some aspects of morality. The articles provided a lot of information on the specific
types of insider trading whereas the books focused more on laws and the effects of insider trading
on the market. Between the sources a larger picture is formed on insider trading.
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Motivation
This study will be beneficial in analyzing whether insiders are using information on earnings
announcements to benefit themselves. It will look at not just top level executives, but other officers
and lower level executives as well. It will also determine if the SEC has been effective in recent
years on limiting abnormal returns by insiders, or if insiders are still using their information to
profit. General Counsels will also have to be examined for the firms being analyzed because they
will impact whether traders are trading more often.
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Question
The question was first posed to me by Professor David Ketcham. He mentioned that he was curious
about the topic of insider trading by corporate insiders. Typically, how the SEC catches insider
trading is that traders draw attention by trading before earnings announcements as well as after.
By trading before and after they maximize their earnings potential. If the announcement will be a
lower than expected announcement, or a negative one, then traders will sell their stock before the
stock price drops following the announcement and buy the stock after the announcement. The chart
below demonstrates what the SEC typically looks for.

F IGURE 1
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Professor Ketcham suggested the idea of corporate insiders delaying their trades of their own
company stock until after a quarterly announcement in order to maximize their monetary gain.
Since the traders delayed their trades until after the quarterly announcement came out and became
public information, could it be considered insider trading since they delayed their activity until the
information they held became public? I decided that since they made the decision based on private
information and delayed their actions until the news became financially favorable to them, that it
was insider trading. An example would be if John Doe, an officer of Company A, was planning
on buying company stock, he would wait until after a bad earnings report came out that caused the
stock price to drop. He would then buy the stock at a low instead of paying the higher price he
would have paid before the missed earnings report had come out. It is unfair because of all of the
traders that bought the stock right before the earnings report came out unaware that Company A
would miss their earnings. Or if John Doe planned on selling his stock, he would wait until after a
positive, or higher than expected earnings announcement came out to sell his stock at a higher
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price than he would have normally received for the sale of his stock. Below is the actions I believe
would result from insiders’ trading post announcement dates.

F IGURE 2

Method
In order to answer our question, research would need to be conducted. In order to conduct a study
based on corporate insiders trading patterns around different earnings reports companies would
have to be selected. The decision was to go after fairly large corporations, so enough information

The Discreet Trader
Senior Capstone Project for Seth Wing

21

could be obtained. It was agreed that the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) would give a large
enough sample (30 of the largest US publicly traded firms). Having chosen the target firms, the
date range for the years 2012 and 2013 was chosen. That would give the study two more recent
years for firms in the DJIA and enough trade activity data by insiders could be collected from those
years. The two years would provide the study with eight quarterly earnings reports per company,
or two hundred and forty reports in total. After the reports were gathered, they had to be sorted
into three categories; above expectations (positive), below expectations (negative), or in line with
expectations (neutral). Using FactSet, the reports were sorted by company, by the earnings
category (positive, negative, or neutral) and by date. On FactSet an earnings report will have
analyst feedback post report as well as change in the stock price following the statement to indicate
how the report faired against expectations. After all of the reports were organized, the corporate
trade information was collected. After everything was put together, the findings were checked to
see if they matched expectations.

Data
The data consisted of thirty companies, two hundred and
forty earnings reports, and two years of corporate trades.
Having selected the companies, the data was then
organized by eight earnings reports for each company.
After looking into FactSet, the report had the date next to
it and either a Positive, Negative, or Neutral ranking next
to it indicating the change in expected earnings. To the

QER
2012 Q1
2012 Q2
2012 Q3
2012 Q4
2013 Q1
2013 Q2
2013 Q3
2013 Q4

QER Date Outcome
25-Apr-12 Neutral
25-Jul-12 Lower
24-Oct-12 Neutral
30-Jan-13 Lower
24-Apr-13 Neutral
24-Jul-13 Neutral
23-Oct-13 Higher
29-Jan-14 Higher
F IGURE 3

right is an example of how the reports were organized. With each report was also the company
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name and ticker (QER stands for Quarterly Earnings Report). This was done for each of the thirty
companies. Figure 3 shows the reports for the company Boeing (BA).
After all of the earnings reports were organized, the trading data was then collected. It was gathered
from the NASDAQ website. The trades came from corporate insiders and were made up from
directors, officers, executives, VPs, and team members ranging from human resources to finance
to operations. From there it was sorted through excel. It was filtered into two columns, Purchases
and Sales. The trade date was recorded at first, leaving out the value of the trades. The first goal
was to see if more trades happened in line with what our expectations were. Below is an example
as to how the trades were sorted.

Purchase Dates Sale Dates
3/12/2014
3/17/2014
3/12/2014
3/14/2014
3/12/2014
3/14/2014
2/18/2014
2/28/2014
2/11/2014
2/18/2014
2/11/2014
2/18/2014
11/18/2013
12/17/2013
10/24/2013
11/21/2013
9/16/2013
11/21/2013
9/11/2013
11/20/2013
9/11/2013
11/18/2013
9/11/2013
11/18/2013
9/11/2013
9/16/2013
F IGURE 4

After all of the trade data was sorted, the trades were organized by date and then referenced with
the quarterly earnings reports to see if the trades fell within the time frame the study was testing.
The study focused on dates for trades twenty days before the earnings report came out and twenty
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days after the report was released which is shown in Appendix A through Appendix C of the
appendix. This gave forty-one days’ worth of trading, including day zero, or the day that the
earnings were announced. To measure all of the corporate insider trading patterns all of the trades
were added together. The reports were first separated into three groupings; positive, negative, and
neutral. The focus was not on the actual dates, but the dates relative to the earnings announcement.
So it did not matter that the trade date was on March 6, 2012, but that the trade date was ten days
before the earnings announcement came out. If another trade date happened during the third
quarter, say September 8, 2012, but was also ten days before the earnings announcement, then it
too would fall under ten days before the announcement and the count for ten days before the
announcement would be two. This process would be continued for each grouping of announcement
types until all of the trades and quarterly earnings announcements were accounted for.
Although there was a group of thirty companies, two were eliminated from the analysis. GE and
Johnson and Johnson were eliminated because of the lack of trading data that was available to get
a full understanding of normal trading in corporations. That left 224 reports. Of those reports, there
were 58 positive earnings announcements 37 negative earnings announcements, and 129 neutral
reports. Of the trading data that fell within those earnings announcements dates, there was a total
of 2,074 trades. There were 1,349 trades that were for purchasing of the stock and 725 trades for
selling of the stock. After all of the data had been sorted I moved on to the analysis of the data.
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Results
The results that were received were mixed. Insiders did in fact make more purchases after a
negative quarterly earnings announcement. Before any the announcements came out there was
little to no activity, which shows that corporate insiders were neither buying nor selling stock
before the negative announcement, but delayed their actions until after the announcement was
released. Of all of the trades 20 days before and 20 days after, 65% of the trades were purchases
and 35% were sales. Of those trades, only 12.15% of trades fell between 20 days before the
earnings announcement through one day before the announcement. The other 87.85% of trades
came on the day of the announcement until 20 days after the announcement. The breakup of trade
data can be seen in the appendix on the table Appendix D.

F IGURE 5

As can be seen in the Figure 5, the days between zero and ten days after announcements accounted
for most of the trade activity. There were initial purchases the day of the report and then a lot of
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net purchases on days five, six and ten. To clarify, net purchases is equal to the purchases on day
x minus the sales on day x. Net Purchases on Dayx = PDx - SDx.
As for trades around a positive report, there was a result different from our hypothesis. There were
more purchases than sales after the report, however the results were more volatile than with the
positive report.

F IGURE 6

In Figure 6 shown above, the net purchases are not quite what was expected. There are more
purchases than sales, causing net purchases to be positive. The equation for net purchases is: Net
Purchases on Dayx = PDx - SDx.
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To check what the graph normally looks like, the net purchases around a neutral earnings
announcement were calculated. Below is what the graph for trades around a normal earnings
announcement looked like.

Net Purchases Around a Neutral Report
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F IGURE 7

The Graph has more trades after the announcement and the majority of them seem to be positive,
indicating more purchases than trades. The graph shows the same equation that was used in the
net purchases equation (Net Purchases on Dayx = PDx - SDx).
Overall there was a trend with more purchases than sales. The trend in net purchases could have
been caused from the overall upward trend in the market during the time of the study. The market
had been coming off of a slump from the recession and investors were confident that the market
would continue to trend upward, so this could be the case for net purchases by corporate insiders.
There was a total of 1,349 stock purchases and 725 stock sales between the two years of data. In
the graphs Appendix E, Appendix F, and Appendix G, I looked at the cumulative trades around
each type of announcement. As was predicted, there was little to no trading before the
announcement and the day of the announcement and onwards, the trading picks up quite steadily.
All have a trend in net purchases, though a neutral report had a more gradual slope with trades also
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coming before the earnings announcement. Running a t-test on the trades for the dates before the
announcement to the trades after the announcement, it was found that only the trades around a
negative report were significantly different. The t-stat to test whether the variance was significant
was used. The average trade from the 20 days before the announcement was 0.4. The mean of
trades on or after the announcement date was 8.09, showing a large average difference in trades
before and after a negative quarterly earnings announcement.
There could be a pattern of more purchases than sales for a few reasons. Corporate insiders might
have had stock options that let them purchase shares at a fixed price, so when there was a positive
announcement they saw the price moving upward and decided to purchase it at their lower price
in order to maximize their options. Another reason the results could not be results could not be
reflective to what was predicted was the data could be incomplete. The source that the trade data
was pulled from could have not had all of the trades and thus would have skewed the information.
There are a few things that could be done to further analyze the data. The share volume of trades
could be measured as well as the market value taken into consideration. This would give a more
precise idea to what the traders were actually gaining. There could have been more purchases than
sales on any given day, but the sales could have been worth more than the purchases. This will be
further looked upon as this study is refined.
Overall, the results did not entirely reflect the predicted hypothesis, but the data will be further
analyzed such as looking at market value transactions (volume of shares of Stock A x the price of
Stock A) and comparing them on positive, negative, and neutral earnings announcements.
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Conclusion
This study showed that corporate insiders are overall net buyers. This could perhaps also have to
do with the time period that the focus of the study was on. In 2012-’13, the stock market was on a
steady climb upwards from its big drop during the recession. Investors were confident that the
market had already hit the low and was only going up. Had the study been conducted for the years
2006-’07 or ’08, the result could have differed, such that insiders were net sellers, as the market
was collapsing during this time. It would be interesting to look at those years and determine if that
is the case. The results showed that almost all traders tended to delay their trades until after the
quarterly earnings announcement had been made. Reasons for this could be to avoid drawing
suspicion from the SEC, or to financially benefit. The increase in net purchases after a negative
announcement fully aligned with our expectations, especially when looking at the cumulative
trades in Appendix F. It is interesting to see how significant the results were when there was just
about no trades at all before the negative announcement and then a large amount of net purchases
the day of the announcement until the fifth to tenth day were trading dropped off afterward.
It was interesting to find that there was almost no trades leading up to any of the announcements.
Almost all traders were waiting until the announcements were made and then trading. This could
have to do with avoiding suspicion from the SEC. Traders have seen what the full might of the
SEC can bring and can be hesitant to deal with them. By trading after the announcement, they can
avoid suspicion and still use their inside information to make premeditated favorable trades. If they
know the stock is going to do well because of an increase in earnings above expectations, then
they can wait to sell their stock at a high. Another interesting pattern is that trading slowed down
around ten days after each type of announcement (positive, negative, or neutral). This shows that
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traders take advantage of the stock while it still is moving around from the announcement. After
the first week or so, the news becomes irrelevant and the investors look forward to the next
announcement. By taking advantage while the stock is still being more heavily traded, corporate
insiders can maximize their profits.
It is the hope that this study has an impact in the investment world. By looking at the patterns of
corporate insiders, the SEC can have a better idea on how to regulate their trading. Imposing trade
restrictions would be the most effective, or by imposing a general counsel to monitor and
approve/disapprove trades. It will also add to the discussion if upper level management should
receive stock compensation (agency theory). If corporate insiders truly do use their information
for financial gains, then awarding stock could further the abuse by these insiders, which would be
bad for stockholders in the long run.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Positive QER (58 Reports)
Days # of Purchases # of Sales Net Purchases
-20
1
1
0
-19
1
1
0
-18
1
1
0
-17
1
1
0
-16
12
10
2
-15
2
2
0
-14
4
2
2
-13
1
0
1
-12
0
0
0
-11
3
3
0
-10
0
0
0
-9
0
0
0
-8
0
0
0
-7
1
0
1
-6
1
0
1
-5
0
0
0
-4
4
2
2
-3
28
0
28
-2
1
0
1
-1
0
0
0
0
13
0
13
1
12
10
2
2
17
13
4
3
4
4
0
4
28
6
22
5
12
18
-6
6
14
15
-1
7
51
27
24
8
6
8
-2
9
13
6
7
10
10
9
1
11
3
4
-1
12
5
0
5
13
11
8
3
14
5
6
-1
15
3
4
-1
16
3
4
-1
17
2
4
-2
18
3
7
-4
19
1
2
-1
20
5
5
0

30
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Appendix B
Days
-20
-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Negative QER (37 Reports)
# of Purchases # of Sales Net Purchases
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
2
0
2
0
1
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
0
0
22
0
22
0
0
0
29
21
8
6
4
2
8
4
4
19
13
6
32
9
23
34
6
28
22
7
15
16
4
12
21
1
20
15
1
14
12
5
7
8
6
2
2
4
-2
1
2
-1
4
3
1
1
1
0
2
3
-1
0
0
0
13
3
10
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Appendix C

Days
-20
-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Neutral QER (129 Reports)
# of Purchases # of Sales
3
1
0
1
13
1
1
0
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
1
15
0
0
0
14
1
2
3
11
0
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
17
0
1
0
42
4
27
2
51
32
19
12
23
19
27
26
22
60
48
29
60
24
44
31
29
5
52
11
42
19
8
11
18
27
23
17
36
30
8
14
29
12
19
8
58
19
13
13

Net
2
-1
12
1
-1
2
1
1
15
0
13
-1
11
1
0
1
-1
17
1
38
25
19
7
4
1
-38
19
36
13
24
41
23
-3
-9
6
6
-6
17
11
39
0
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Appendix D

Trade
Purchases
Sales
Total

(20) --> (1)
205
47
252

0 --> +20
1144
678
1822

Total
1349
725

Appendix E

Accumulated Net Purchases around a Positive
Announcement
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Appendix F

Appendix G

Accumulated Net Purchases around a Neutral
Announcement
400
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